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LAW AND SCIENCE: MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE OR MERETRICIOUS
RELATIONSHIP?
Leo A. Huard*
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in the age of science-not simply an age of science,
nor a scientific age, but the age of science. Science, its products and
its gadgets, plays a controlling part in our daily lives. Our comfort,
at home and at work, is assured by air conditioning. Our food is
augmented and supplemented by vitamins and other complex chem-
ical agents. Health is sustained by miracle drugs and a variety of
biochemical marvels. We travel behind jet engines in aircraft pro-
duced by highly advanced aerodynamic engineering. Our cars are
pulled along by compact and fantastically powerful engines and
are brought to smooth stops by marvelously efficient brakes. We
pollute the air with the gases exhausted by all these machines and
then we set up air pollution control agencies to devise ways and
means to purify it again. The examples of "science-in-daily-life"
could continue for many pages.
The pervasive influence of science extends also to war and
annihilation. A great deal of our military planning depends upon
computer science. Nuclear bombs have made infinite our capacity
for destruction. Our military scientists are refining nerve gases
capable of incapacitating whole populations swiftly, silently, with-
out warning. Bacteriological warfare, capable of making water
supplies lethal and foodstuffs poisonous, can now be waged.
Today's man in the street is expected to achieve some under-
standing of the meaning of "orbiting" the earth and of rockets with
multi-million pounds of "thrust"-even though he had trouble com-
prehending the law of gravity when he was in school. Our news-
papers and magazines, radio and television (two important scientific
products in themselves) constantly assail the eye and the ear with
stories of the race to the moon, Telstar, development of food for
use on years long-rocket trips, nuclear electric power versus con-
ventional electric power, the benefits and the ills of radiation and
sundry other technological advances.
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He must know enough about these phenomena to choose intel-
ligently the men who will represent him in the state and federal
government. Those selected must, in turn, be able to assess the rela-
tive importance of many scientific programs since they must approve
or disapprove of these programs and provide for their budgetary
needs.
It is not strange that in an atmosphere saturated with the
things of science, the opinions and the judgments of men of science
have acquired a very great importance. It is somewhat unsettling
that these opinions and judgments are often uncritically accepted
in fields far beyond the area of their competence.
The law has not been immune from this incursion by science.
Some measure of the penetration of scientific methodology into law
is the fact that an entire recent issue of a highly respected law review
is devoted to a symposium on Jurimetricts-defined as "the scien-
tific investigation of legal problems."' One article therein is entitled:
"Simultaneous Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of
Judicial Decisions."' I wonder how many lawyers are really pre-
pared to meet the challenge expressed by this title. I am notl Of
the authors in the symposium, five have the LL.B. degree, six have
not, and another is best identified as a Soviet law professor.
In this paper, I propose to examine the impact of science and
technology upon our legal institutions. That is to say, I would like
to discuss the application of the investigative procedure called the
scientific method to law and explore the utility of scientific theory
in law. The other branch of my inquiry will be directed to the
use of the machines of science in the practice of law, i.e., computers
and mechanical search devices. My emphasis throughout will be
on the physical sciences and coverage of the social sciences will
be incidental.
This formidable task could only be completed in a very long
article. The reader is asked to attribute all deficiencies to limitations
of time and space.
II. SCIENTIFIC METHOD, THEORY AND CONCEPTS
My daughter's high school biology textbook describes the
scientific method as involving the following steps: 1. defining a
problem; 2. formulating a hypothesis to explain the problem; 3.
1 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1-270 (1963).
2 Id. at 1, Foreword.
8 Kort, Simultaneous Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of Judicial
Decisions, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 143 (1963).
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planning and carrying out experiments to prove or disprove the
hypothesis; 4. recording and evaluating the facts observed; and,
5. drawing conclusions from these observed facts and explaining
the problem in their light.4 This seems clear and reasonably easy
for the lay mind to grasp. It should provide a sufficiently basic
starting point for a consideration of science by lawyers. The de-
scription also seems to be accurate since it is repeated in substance
in a recent, much more sophisticated publication5 advocating the
application of the method to a study of the judicial process.
The goal of the scientific method is the accumulation of knowl-
edge and it is admirably suited to this purpose. However, the goal
of the lawyer and the judge, of the legal process and the judicial
process is not always knowledge. Sometimes it is truth, or justice or
law-and these are not always, perhaps not often, identical to
knowledge. They usually contain something more than mere knowl-
edge, something beyond and above knowledgel Truth, law and
justice are not even always identical to one another. The law can-
not always be equated with justice and truth. Justice may be tem-
pered with mercy and thus become more perfect; truth, if it could
be so tempered would cease to be truth. These concepts are foreign
to the scientific method. The lawyer and the court are often engaged
in a search for something beyond factual data or information.
Scientists seem not to understand this search and they tend to
deride its importance.
If these distinctions are kept in mind, the scientific method can
be very useful to the lawyer and the judge. Wherever their goal is
the ascertainment of information, the scientific method is a very
efficient tool, perhaps the best. It should not be cast aside simply
because it comes to us from another discipline. Beyond specific use
in fact gathering, the scientific method encourages the orderly
organization of data and logical progression from one bit of factual
evidence to another. These qualities are valuable in any discipline
and are obviously valuable to the lawyer in many areas of law
practice.
The scientific method has often been given a more generalized
meaning, when applied to law, than the narrow "natural science"
meaning we have attached to it here. Patterson has said that it
sometimes means "any legal theory that bases at least its instru-
mental evaluations on some observable facts,"' and he includes in
4 TASCmDJIAN and HUBBERT, BIOLocY-INQUIRY INTO Lnm 11 (1961).
5 ULMER, Scientific Method and the Judicial Process, 7 Am. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
21 (1963).
e PATTERSON, LAW IN A ScIEmNTIIC AGE 48 (1963).
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this category, the "scientific ethical relativism" of Arnold Brecht-
a curious m6lange of natural law and science-oriented thought.7
Professor Patterson combines strict scientific inquiry and the looser
techniques described in the quotation above under the term "legal
empiricism."'
Does this mean that there is already a scientific jurisprudence?
Certainly Patterson's slim volume and Brecht's bulkier work can
hardly make such an ambitious claim. In a recent article, Walter
Berns describes Beutel's Some Potentialities of Experimental Juris-
prudence as a New Branch of Social Science (1957) as "the princi-
pal work of scientific jurisprudence in our day"9 and then tears it
apart unmercifully. Time and space do not permit defending Beutel's
thesis even if one were so inclined, and sympathetic to it! Sufficient
to say that the existence of this work is in itself an indication of
the impact of science on law-as is Berns' article and the sympo-
sium in which it appears.'0 Beutel espouses a science-oriented juris-
prudence and Berns cautions against it saying:
... a grasp of the fundamental problems might reveal that there is an
irresolvable tension between science ...and politics, and that any
attempt to resolve the tension is likely to have terrible consequences
in the political world; that the political world must be ruled not by
science but by prudence."
Lawyers and judges, the legal process and the judicial process,
are all a part and parcel of the political world.
Under any definition or description, the scientific method and
scientific thought should be given a place in the lawyer's bag of
skills. Great care must be exercised, however, not to accept science
unreservedly nor apply it broadside to legal and political problems.
The concepts of science cannot always be applied profitably to legal
questions. It has been said that the "unanswerable questions of life
belong to the realm of philosophy, and jurisprudence is the philos-
ophy of law."' 2 Scientific questions can be answered, at least par-
tially, by doing something and observing the result. Scientific answers
can be found in the laboratory. The answers of jurisprudence are
often only speculation, preference or faith.' 3 Legal thinking and
7 See BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY 117-135, 215-231 (1959). See also Mearns,
Scientific Legal Theory and Arnold Brecht, 47 VA. L. REv. 264 (1961).
8 See note 6, supra, at 48.
9 Berns, Law and Behavioral Science, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 185, 208 (1963).
10 Jurimetrics, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1-270 (1963).
11 See note 9, supra, at 212.
12 Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Methodology of Legal Inquiry, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 7 (1963).
13 See note 10. Law is tied to philosophy and history, rather than to natural
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the scientific approach to problem solving differ in many important
respects. Six such differences have been isolated by a recent investi-
gator.
1. Scientific approaches tend to emphasize the general. Law
tends to stress the unique, particular aspects of a case.
2. The hard core of legal thinking is not in terms of means
and ends. Science deals in causal and functional relation-
ships.
3. Legal thinking takes a normative view of truth-certain
kinds of probable truth demand stronger proof than others.
This view of truth is alien to science.
4. Legal thinking is oriented to the past rather than the future
-to what has happened rather than to what will happen.
Science relies much less on the past.
5. Law is a comparison process and science is not.
6. Legal thinking demands that rights and duties be present
or absent. Thus the courts are frequently prevented from
reaching compromise solutions. 4
We began, some time ago, with a basic, almost elemental,
definition of the scientific method. We explored its utility in law
and found it useful. We moved to the possibility of a scientific
jurisprudence and found this unlikely-at least if jurisprudence im-
plies a comprehensive system of legal philosophy. We move on again.
Does science qua science deserve a more important role in
forming the legal and political thought of this nation? Should policy
making in law and government depend in considerable measure on
scientific method, scientific theory and scientific concepts? Perhaps
not. A very distinguished scientist has publicly doubted the value
of scientific education for a public affairs career.
To claim that the study of science is the best education for young
men who aspire to become impartial analysts of human affairs is to
put forward a very dubious educational hypothesis at best. Indeed,
those who contend that the habits of thought and the point of view
of the scientist as a scientist can be transferred with advantage to
other human activities have hard work documenting their proposition.
Only an occasional brave man will be found nowadays to claim that
the so-called scientific method is applicable to the solution of almost
all the problems of daily life in the modern world.15
science. "Legal science" is only a verbalism. See Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and
Voting Behavior, The 1961 Term ol the United States Supreme Court, 28 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 100, 101 (1963).
14 Aubert, Researches in the Sociology oj Law, 7 Am. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 16,
17 (1963). Professor Aubert is not a "common-law" lawyer.
15 CONANT, ON UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE 10 (1947). The book is based on the
Terry Lectures delivered at Yale University by Dr. Conant in 1946.
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These words were spoken some 18 years ago and they may
sound strange to those who have become accustomed to the cult of
science which has developed since that time. Today, in the era
of Moonshot and Mohole, it is heresy to doubt the man of science.
He is infallible even in fields outside of his specialty. We have
swallowed whole the notion that men of science have been divinely
touched with a special sort of wisdom. The President, the Congress,
masses of bureaucrats and millions of John and Jane Does listen
respectfully while scientists explain the theory and technology of
sending a rocket to the moon or of digging a hole into the bowels
of the earth. This is at it should be ! They continue to listen with
respect and belief while the scientist goes on to pontificate about
the desirability of maintaining an all-out nuclear striking force and
whether this nation should wage war against Cuba or not. This is
nonsense! As Dr. Conant points out, scientific education is not par-
ticularly good training upon which to base value judgments on
matters of public policy. The businessman, the accountant, the
lawyer and the dentist are every bit as competent, and sometimes
much more competent than the scientist to formulate such judg-
ments. Yet, they kow-tow slavishly to these panjandrums of science.
Our policy-making machinery is in danger of being taken over
by scientists and science has become the principal Establishment in
our national political system. 6 A special breed of scientist, the
scientist-manager, continues to extend his influence in government
and industry and he now poses a grave threat to our political com-
munity." Scientists are gradually merging into technicians and the
two are becoming indistinguishable. Formerly the scientist pursued
truth for its own sake and the technician was concerned with the
usefulness or fitness of his work. It may be that this distinction is
blurring and that, in many fields, the scientist has lost his neu-
trality.18
Even the vaunted detachment of scientific inquiry and the
emotional stability of the scientist have been challenged-and by
one of the breed, not an outsider.19 Dr. Conant, once a distinguished
chemist, asks:
10 Price, The Scientific Establishment, 106 PROC. AMER. PHI. Soc. 235 (1962).
17 Buchanan in Science, Scientists, and Politics, An Occasional Paper on the Role
of Science and Technology in the Free Society 4 (1963), published by the Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions. This paper will hereafter be cited Science, Sci-
entists and Politics (1963).
18 Id. at 5. See also, Stover, The Government of Science 17, 24 (1962). A Report
to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions; See also, Waterman, Science
in the Service of Man, 19 BULL. AToMic SCIENTISTS 3 (May 1963).
19 CONANT, note 15 supra, at 5-7.
[Vol. 5
LAW AND SCIENCE
Would it be too much to say that in the natural sciences today the
given social environment has made it very easy for even an emotionally
unstable person to be exact and impartial in his laboratory? The
traditions he inherits, his instruments, the high degree of specialization,
the crowd of witnesses that surrounds him ... these all exert pressures
that make impartiality on matters of his science almost automatic.
Let him deviate from the rigorous role of impartial experimenter or
observer at his peril; he knows all too well what a fool So-and-so
made of himself by blindly sticking to a set of observations or a theory
now clearly recognized to be in error. But once he closes the laboratory
door behind him, he can indulge his fancy all he pleases and perhaps
with all the less restraint because he is now free from the imposed
discipline of his calling. One would not be surprised, therefore, if as
regards matters beyond their professional competence laboratory
workers were a little less impartial and self-restrained than other men,
though my own observations lead me to conclude that as human beings
scientific investigators are statistically distributed over the whole spec-
trum of human folly and wisdom much as other men.
20
It might be wise to force the chairman of every legislative
committee, before whom a scientist is to testify, to read the above
quotation before the testimony is heard. At worst, it plants the
seed of a very important doubt; at best, it reduces the scientist from
omnipotence to humanity. Dr. Conant was speaking of the natural
scientist but Professor Patterson has accused the social scientist of
a similar lack of neutrality.21
It has remained, however, for a non-scientific academician-
cum-foundation director and scholar to mount the most vigorous
attack against science and scientists in the political world. Robert
M. Hutchins, President, Fund for the Republic, has said:
I wish at the outset to repudiate C. P. Snow, who intimates in one
of his books that scientists should be entrusted with the world because
they are a little bit better than other people. My view, based on long
and painful observation, is that professors are somewhat worse than
other people, and that scientists are somewhat worse than other pro-
fessors. Let me demonstrate that these propositions are self-evidently
true.
The foundation of morality in our society is a desire to protect one's
reputation. A professor's reputation depends entirely upon his books
and his articles in learned journals. The narrower the field in which a
man must tell the truth, the wider is the area in which he is free to
lie. This is one of the advantages of specialization. C. P. Snow was
right about the morality of the man of science within his profession.
There have been very few scientific frauds. This is because a scientist
would be a fool to commit a scientific fraud when he can commit frauds
20 Id. at 7-8. See also PArrERSON, supra note 6, at 36-37, the superiority of judi-
cial impartiality over that of natural scientists in political pronouncements.
21 PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 44-46.
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every day on his wife, his associates, the president of his university,
and the grocer. Administrators, politicians (not campaigning), and
butchers are all likely to be more virtuous than professors, not because
they want to be, but because they have to be.22
The next time the reader is tempted to accept blindly the
philosophical, political, sociological or legal ukases of a Nobel
laureate in biology, chemistry or physics, he should read the above.
The reader is then free to believe the scientist's pronunciamento
or to accept it as one item of evidence in the totality of testimony
on the subject, and, hopefully, to make up his mind by bringing
his own learning and experience to bear upon all the evidence.
There seems to be opinion of substance that the thinking of
scientists and the concepts of science are not particularly useful
outside of science itself. Scientific infallibility, scientific detachment
and emotional stability take on the aspect of myths. The "polit-
ical" scientist is omnipresent and heard on every subject.
When scientists enter politics, whether as officials or advisors, they in-
evitably carry with them the authority of the scientific community.
Often this is simply granted; sometimes the impression is deliberately
sought. In either case, if the authority is not to be a sham, destroying
the integrity of both politics and science, the scientist and his profes-
sional community must take responsibility for its wide use. The
individual scientist must make his own position clear and identify the
voice with which he speaks. The scientific community must establish
its own identity, clarify its role and responsibilities, and develop sound
policy positions. On scientific questions, its voice should be heard
through its most learned members. On questions of public policy af-
fecting the welfare of science and the general society, the voice
should be carried by responsible scientific leaders empowered to re-
present the conclusions of the scientific community arrived at through
representative and deliberative councils.
Some efforts in this direction have already been made through the
specialized associations of scientists. . . . Groups explicitly committed
to participation in the political process ... have been valuable on many
occasions. Yet it is doubtful that any of these efforts has gone far
enough in fulfilling the responsibilities of the scientific community to
maintain the integrity of science and guarantee that its contributions
to public policy are sound. Men of science must give more thoughtful
22 Hutchins, Science, Scientists and Politics 1 (1963). For those who do not
have easy access to the occasional papers of The Center for the Study of the Demo-
cratic Institutions, reference is made to a reprint in PAGEANT, Feb. 1964, p. 13.
23 The adjective "political" is used in this sarcastic sense by Michael, Science,
Scientists and Politics 6, 7 (1963). For political expressions by prominent scientists
see, Szilard, Are We on the Road to War, 18 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 23 (April
1962); Glass, Scientists in Politics, 18 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 2 (May 1962);
Sponsler, Needed: Scientists on Top, 18 BULL. ATOMIC ScIEnTIsTS 17 (June 1962);
Rabinowitch, After Cuba: Two Lessons, 19 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 2 (Feb. 1963).
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attention to their professional responsibilities if they are to help make
a good world.
24
Men of law have a duty to test the soundness of scientific think-
ing and concepts before accepting them into legal thought and
theory. All men must bring a healthy skepticism to bear on scientific
opinion in order to prevent an unhealthy bias from being imposed
on our political institutions.
III. THE MACHINES OF SCIENCE IN LAW PRACTICE
We turn now to the effect that the gadgetry of science is having,
and will have, on the practice of law. Every lawyer must do some
research, no matter how humble and pedestrian his practice may
be. Reference must be made to decided judicial cases, ordinances,
statutes, administrative rules and regulations and the decisions of
administrative agencies at the municipal, state and federal levels. In
practice we are completely dependent on stored information; we
are the slaves of the printed word.
In the years since his graduation from law school, the average
lawyer has watched with awe as law libraries grew all about him.
He has reacted with helpless perplexity to the demands of his own
practice for ever more printed materials. It is doubtful, however,
whether the members of the profession have fully realized the pro-
portions of the informational dilemma which confronts them.
From 1658 to 1879, a period of 221 years, the reported American
cases numbered about 407,000. From 1879 to 1932, a period of fifty-
three years, they numbered about 1,121,000. Approximately to equal
this latter figure, it has taken only the twenty-nine years since 1932.
In quantity alone, therefore, the volume of reported case law has in-
creased at a strongly accelerating rate. Although this is hardly sur-
prising in view of the increases in population, it shows how greatly
the aggregate fund of case law available for legal research has in-
creased.25
These figures enumerate the case law only. The Federal Register
alone publishes about 15,000 pages of rules, regulations and orders
annually. Think for a moment of the avalanche of judicial and ad-
ministrative material also produced in the states, particularly pop-
ulous states such as California and New York.
24 Stover, The Government of Science 21-22 (1962). A Report to the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions.
25 Dickerson, Electronic Computers and the Practical Lawyer, 14 J. LxAL ED.
485, 486 (1962). See also, Eldridge and Dennis, The Computer as a Tool for Legal
Research, 28 LAW & CoN=P. PROB. 78 (1963). Ibid. All literature may soon be
legal. The authors also coin a term I cannot resist-"cosmoprudence."
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In defense against this unmanageable bulk of information, the
lawyer has tended to specialize. This is, of course, an incomplete
answer-for one thing, not all lawyers can specialize. A better
answer would be to devise ways and means of making the stored
information easily accessible. If the lawyer can devote less time to
research, and other routine tasks, he will have more time to make
the professional judgments for which his clients hire him. By
eliminating the physical work of searching the indexes and digests,
he will gain more "thinking" time. This is highly desirable both
from the lawyer's viewpoint and that of his clients.
Science and technology have come to the help of the lawyer in
this quandary. Mechanical and electronic means have been devised
to store and retrieve all manner of data. At the annual meeting of
the American Bar Association in San Francisco, August 4-9, 1962,
many of these storage and retrieval systems were demonstrated.
The program prepared by the association's Special Committee on
Electronic Data Retrieval lists: (a) Computer Indexing, Storage
and Retrieval (for statutory law, case law and public law); (b)
Specialized Computer Applications (case prediction, estate planning,
Keyword in context index); and, (c) Manual Indexing Aids (Proj-
ect Lawsearch and Port-a-Punch Cards) .26 All this indicates a
fairly advanced state of the art.
In the area of computer indexing, storage and retrieval, the
demonstrations included the work of John F. Horty and his as-
sociates at the Health Law Center, University of Pittsburgh. Mr.
Horty has stored on tape in a computer the entire text of the
Pennsylvania statutes, some 31,000 sections with over 6,000,000
words. This stored information can be retrieved on command, in
the form of a verbatim "print-out" of statutory sections." Professor
Robert Wilson, Research Director of the Southwestern Legal Foun-
dation has applied the Horty system (called Key-Word-in-Combina-
tion) to case law-specifically to the arbitration cases of five states.28
Professor John Lyons of the Graduate School of Public Law, George
Washington University, is similarly engaged in determining the
feasibility of using computers as legal research tools in the field of
public law.
28 Electronic and Mechanical Aids to Legal Research and Problem Solving,
Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval, Annual Meeting American Bar
Association, August 4-9, 1962.
27 Horty's work has been described in many places. For a good recent discussion,
see, Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Methodology of Legal Inquiry, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP.PROB. 5, 10-13 (1963); see also, Eldridge and Dennis, The Computer as a Tool for
Legal Research, id. at 78, 87-89.28 Eldridge and Dennis, supra note 27, at 89-90; Maas, Research Help is Coming,
38 J. STATE BAR OF CALiF. 405, 409-410 (1963).
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The manual indexing aids are much less dramatic than the
computers. These systems are specifically designed for law office or
law library use by individual researchers. They consist basically of
indexing relevant legal materials on cards which can then be sorted
out quickly because they are notched or punched for that purpose.29
By far the most interesting and most controversial of the
scientific aids to the lawyer is the use of computers in predicting the
outcome of cases. The idea that a machine can predict how a court
will decide a particular case strikes the average lawyer as almost
sacrilegious. Nevertheless, this is precisely the thesis advanced by
two learned and courageous men-Fred Kort and Reed C. Lawlor.
Professor Kort is a political scientist and Mr. Lawlor is a patent
attorney."° Both have done a great deal of work in an effort to
prove that judicial decisions are susceptible to mathematical pre-
diction. Mr. Lawlor has given many demonstrations of this art
(skill?) at bar association meetings and other professional gather-
ings. As a witness and participant in one of these demonstrations,
81
I can testify that Mr. Lawlor's results produce a distinct feeling of
unease. As an unbeliever, however, I am constrained to admit that
his results are impressive! It is the law's great loss that we cannot
now have the benefit of Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion of the work of
Professor Kort and Mr. Lawlor in view of Holmes' expressed
confidence in the importance of science in law. " How would that
great champion of the common law react to science in such ample
measure?
The theory proposed by Professor Kort and Mr. Lawlor is
much more detailed and complex than we have been able to indicate
here. We hope that we have not done them an injustice by giving the
impression that they have advanced a sketchy, ill-considered theory.
29 Maas, supra note 28, at 406-408; see also, Dickerson, supra note 25, at 491-493.
30 Fred Kort is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of
Connecticut. Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantita-
tive Analysis of the "Right to Counsel" Cases, 51 Am. POL. Sci. Rav. 1 (1957) ; Kort,
Simultaneous Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of Judicial Decisions,
28 LAW & CoNrtMP. PROB. 143 (1963). Reed C. Lawlor is a member of the California
Bar practicing patent law in Los Angeles. The theory underlying Mr. Lawlor's methods
is most completely presented in a paper, apparently published privately in 1962,
entitled "Prediction of Court Decisions." A more easily available exposition is: Lawlor,
What Computers Can Do: Analysis and Prediction of Judicial Decisions, 49 A.BA.J.
337 (1963).
31 The occasion was a "Seminar on Use of Electronic Computers for Legal
Research" in San Jose, California, May 24 and 25, 1963. The seminar was sponsored
by the Santa Clara County Bar Association. Among the participating organizations:
San Jose State College, University of Santa Clara Law School, Stanford University
Law School, University of California Law School (Berkeley).
32 Hou.zs, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210,
242 (1920).
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Far from it, they have brought learning and serious consideration
to the problem of prediction of judicial decisions by mathematical
and electronic means. We would be remiss, however, if we did not
draw attention to the vigor of the opposition to the Kort-Lawlor
prediction theory.
The most forceful and indignant critic of the theory that
judicial decisions are electronically predictable is Frederick Bernays
Wiener. In fact, Mr. Wiener is distinctly dubious of the utility of
the computer even as a research tool. Frederick Bernays Wiener is
a scholarly, extremely competent lawyer who has for many years
specialized in appellate practice." It seems fair to say that the fol-
lowing quotation expresses his views concerning electronics and the
law.
In the opinion of the present writer, for reasons about to be set forth,
the notion that a computer can predict the course of judicial decision
rests on assumptions that are demonstrably untenable, does violence
to the very nature of law, and is moreover certain to blunt the pro-
fessional techniques of any lawyer who relies on machines rather than
on his own powers of reasoning and advocacy. All this will no doubt
be obvious to most American Bar Association members. But the in-
tensity, indeed fervor, with which the computer proponents put their
case suggests that, here also, "we need education in the obvious more
than investigation of the obscure." 34
Mr. Wiener's criticisms may seem intemperate to some but
they are grounded in firm conviction and based upon broad profes-
sional experience. Others have expressed somewhat more moderate
views.35 All in all, it seems clear that Messrs. Kort and Lawlor are
suffering the vicissitudes common to pioneers: lack of appreciation
(at best); and, opprobrium (at worst).
Even at this early day in the application of computer science
83 Mr. Wiener is the author of a highly regarded work on appellate law
practice. WIENER, EFFEcTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY (1950). He is also a frequent con-
tributor to legal periodicals.
84 Wiener, Decision Prediction by Computers: Nonsense Cubed-and Worse, 48
A.B.A.J. 1023-1024 (1962). The last lines of the quotation are from HOLMES, Law and
the Court (1913) in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 292-293 (1920).
S5 Mr. Lawlor seems to feel that the ascendancy of science-machines has
frightened some lawyers. Lawlor, What Computers Can Do: Analysis and Prediction
of Judicial Decisions, 49 A.B.A.J. 337 (1963). For this proposition, he cites Dicker-
son, Some Jurisprudential Implications of Electronic Data Processing, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 53 (1963). Professor Dickerson is critical but it seems an exaggeration
to say that he is frightened by the incursions of science into law. However, he does
spell out the fears and the worries of many lawyers at the increasing use of computers
in law and law practice. See also, Spengler, Machine-Made Justice: Some Implications,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 36 (1963). It should be noted that Professor Spengler
is in agreement with some of Wiener's arguments, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 36,
52 note 37.
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to law there have been some eminently practical legal questions
raised concerning their use. For instance, computers store records
and the introduction of records into court is a vital and necessary
part of litigation. Without records available for use at trial, the
trial lawyer often would be helpless. The records of the computer
are stored on punched cards, tapes and wires. Are these susceptible
to the subpoena power?"6 How would the best evidence rule, the
hearsay rule and the shopbook rule apply to "records" of this kind?
Is computer evidence expert testimony?
3 7
The lawyer must also ask himself: Who is custodian of these
records-the programmer, the machine operator, the system de-
signer? It does not require extra-sensory perception to foresee great
difficulty for the lawyer attempting to explain the basis for the
admissibility of the "print-out" from a computer.8s
Of more than passing interest in the computer field are the problems
which may develop in the law of torts. In the field of latent defects,
it is likely that the basic law as set forth in McPherson v. Buick [sic]
will be unchanged. However, the assessment of liability against the
responsible party will be made doubly difficult. One example will serve
to illustrate this point. Not long ago a new type aircraft crashed, result-
ing in considerable loss of life. The cause of the crash was determined
to be a defective wing strut, which had been designed by the use of a
computer. The question has now arisen as to what extent liability
may be assessed against an aircraft manufacturer as the users of the
computer, against both the computer manufacturer and the aircraft
manufacturer because the program analyst and the console operator
acted as agents for both, and against the computer manufacturer for
a failure of the computer due to faulty manufacture.3 9
What would Cardozo's luminous intellect do with these ques-
tions? Obviously, the issues raised in the above quotation will be
multiplied a hundredfold, a thousandfold as the use of computers
increases.40 What should we do to meet this challenge of computer
science? Are we really discharging our professional responsibilities
in this area? If not, what does professional duty require?
IV. SCIENCE AND THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
At the beginning of this paper, we proposed to discuss science
and technology as they touched upon law and legal institutions.
36 At common-law only documents could be subpoenaed; under the federal rules,
however, "tangible objects" may be subpoenaed. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b).
37 Douglass, Automatic Data Processing and the Government Lawyer, 22 FaD.
B.J. 137, 140-141 (1962).
38 Ibid.
39 Douglass note 37, supra, at 141-142.
40 For other practical applications of computers having legal significance, see,
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The subject now at hand is perhaps not strictly true to this dichot-
omy. Herein I would speak of the long-time influence of the federal
government on science and the more recent phenomenon of the
government contract, in some respects a means by which science in-
fluences the federal government.
The federal government has a long history41 of assistance and
encouragement to science and scientists. The Patent Office was
created in 1790, the United States Coast Survey was established in
1807, Franklin Institute received the first grant for experimental
research in 1832 and the passage of the Morrill Act 2 and establish-
ment of the Department of Agriculture in 1862 initiated a sub-
stantial and durable program of federal aid to science and tech-
nology.
The National Academy of Science was chartered in 1863. The
National Bureau of Standards began its distinguished career in,
and for, science in 1901. During World War II, a tremendous
mobilization of scientific effort was effected and the Office of Sci-
entific Research and Development emerged. After the war, the
Atomic Energy Commission was created in 1946.48 The National
Science Foundation appeared in 1950 with the responsibility for
the development of a national policy to promote research and
education in the sciences. Most recently, Congress put the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration into operation.4
President Eisenhower thought it necessary to appoint a science
adviser and a Science Advisory Committee. Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson have continued the practice. In recent years, proposals
have frequently been advanced for a cabinet Department of Science
and Technology.45 The march of science continuesl
In 1960-1961, federal funds allocated to basic research ac-
counted for 60% of national basic research expenditures from all
sources-$1.1 billion.4  When such vast sums are involved, it can
Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Methodology of Legal Inquiry, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB.
5, 30-35 (1963).
41 See, Stover, The Government of Science 10-16 (1962). A Report to the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Mr. Stover sets out this history in a concise
and interesting fashion.
42 12 Stat. 503 (1862), 7 U.S.C. § § 301-348 (1958).
48 60 Stat. 755 (1946), as amended, 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § § 2011-2296
(1958).
44 72 Stat. 426 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § § 2451-2459, 2471-2476 (1958).
45 Stover, supra note 41, at 41-44.
46 Id. at 15 (text) and 47 (note 5). Without specifying allocations to basic re-
search, the 1965 budget message seems to continue federal generosity to science and
technology generally. Atomic Energy is to receive $2.735 billions and Space Research
and Technology $4.990 billions in 1965. 22 CONG. QUART. WEFKLy REPT. 138, 140
(Jan. 24, 1964).
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be supposed that science loses some of its freedom of action and
becomes government directed to an uncertain extent. On the other
hand, when so many scientists are involved in these vast expenditures
for projects important to the national security, it can scarcely
be doubted that scientists have a vital impact on governmental
policies.
This is "Big Science" and it is largely supported and made
possible by the government contract and its handmaiden-the non-
profit corporation. Within the memory of most lawyers who read
this paper, the government contract was a relatively simple legal
instrument used to procure supplies for the federal government. It
was ignored in law schools and few lawyers ever saw one, much less
negotiated one.
Now, a comparatively large group of attorneys specialize in
government contract law and draw all or most of their livelihood
from a law practice limited to such contracts. Many, perhaps most
law schools, now have one or more courses dealing with the law of
government contracts. The government contract has been used to
control research and development in "basic research, systems
analysis, systems engineering . . . technical direction, testing, and
manufacturing.14 7 The government also contracts "for policy plan-
ning, management of government facilities, technical assistance
activities, educational programs, and management surveys. '48 This
is a far cry from our earlier understanding of government procure-
ment.
The government contract enables the federal government to
accomplish many useful, desirable and expedient things which could
not be performed within the normal structure of the federal govern-
ment. It circumvents embarrassing problems in governmental ad-
ministration, for instance, it makes it possible to pay higher salaries
for government work than the civil service pay scale permits.
In essence, the government contract effects a delegation of
governmental power to a private institution, which, of course, need
not account to the public as an agency of government would be
required to do. It has led to the development of the non-profit
corporation as a vehicle for achieving governmental objectives. This
phenomenon is a direct product of the era of science unknown to
prior ages. The world has never seen anything like the Rand* Cor-
poration, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Aerospace Corpora-
47 Stover, supra note 41, at 27.
48 Ibid.
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tion and the Communications Satellite Corporation. These corporate
entities are, in fact, camouflaged government agencies. 9
• . . in the hands of Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, and Karl T.
Compton, the government contract became a new type of federalism.
In dollar volume, the biggest contracts are between the military
services and industrial corporations; while most of this money goes for
procurement, much of it goes for research and development, and for
the kind of systems analysis and the direction and supervision of sub-
contractors that in a simpler age would have been done by the technical
services of the Army and Navy. And even in the business of procure-
ment, the contractual relation is not the traditional market affair: the
contract is not let on competitive bids, the product cannot be specified,
the price is not fixed, the government supplies much of the plant and
capital, and the government may determine or approve the letting of
subcontracts, the salaries of key executives, and a host of other
managerial matters. A sizeable proportion of the government's (and
nation's) business is done this way .... 50
This contractual system has broken down the political opposi-
tion to federal assistance more effectively than did any program of
grants to the states. It has now become respectable for a state to
base a substantial part of its economy on government contracts.
A great deal of private enterprise is now secreted in the interstices
of government contracts. In short, what the grant-in-aid programs did
to the arguments for states' rights, the new contractual systems are
doing to those for pure private enterprise.51
V. CONCLUSION
The scientific method is very useful in fact finding. It does not
have the same success, however, when one seeks to use it as the
basis for a system of jurisprudence. Science and its method are
producers of knowledge not particularly well suited to making value
judgments. Scientific education is not geared to turning out minds
which easily grasp and correctly resolve the issues found in the legal
and political world. The detachment which the scientist brings to
the problems of his specialty is not often transferred to questions
outside of that field.
Science can help the law and the lawyer but it must not be
permitted to supplant or exclude other methods of investigation and
reasoning. The lawyer must treat science as one of the many tools
in his kit, a single weapon in his large arsenal. By the same token,
49, Id. at 29-32.
50 Price, The Scientific Establishment, 106 PROC. AmER. PMIL. Soc. 235, 241-242
(1962).
51 Id. at 243.
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men of law and men of politics must keep firmly in mind that in
the legal-political arena, the scientist enjoys no special position of
eminence. His views are worthy of belief only to the extent that
he is knowledgeable on the particular legal or political issue at
hand. The arrogance of the scientist speaking on non-scientific sub-
jects should not be permitted to weaken this stand. s
The great technological advances of science-the ingenious
machines for mechanical research and the marvelous electronic
computers-have an immediate and positive value to the lawyer.
They can make the task of research infinitely easier and faster. All
the time-consuming physical effort of library research is eliminated.
One question arises, however. If library research technique is no
longer necessary to the lawyer, will the law schools teach it? If they
do, will it be a required course? An elective? It seems to me that
a very valuable part of the lawyer's training will vanish if "Legal
Bib" is dropped from the curriculum. As a law treacher, I am al-
most always suspicious of devices which eliminate "routine" and
save the "lawyer's time." Often the net effect is to reduce a seg-
ment of law practice to the level of a trade, to something that can
be done by a clerk or secretary, without supervision or under the
most casual supervision. When this happens the profession does not
gain.
Prediction of judicial decisions by means of computers may
be possible. It does not seem to me, however, that this adds anything
to the administration of justice or to the practice of law. In the
hands of the unscrupulous, it may even be dangerous. I would be
surprised if this aspect of computer science ever went beyond the
stage of a scientific game.
The government contract will continue to afford a substantial
field of law practice. It provides a deceptively easy way for the
government to carry on its business and it is likely to increase rather
than to decrease. It is sometimes unhealthy in the sense that it
permits the government to do something indirectly that it could not
do through its usual, normal and direct procedures. The same
criticism can be leveled at the governmental non-profit corporation.
The government contract and the non-profit corporation also often
have the effect of delegating some of the power of government to
private parties who cannot be held accountable to the people or
52 Wohlstetter, Scientists, Seers and Strategy, 41 FOREIGN A FAIRS 466, 470-472,
475-476 (1963); Physical Scientist Thinks He's a Seer, San Jose Mercury, May 16,
1963, p. 61, col. 1; Royce Brier, Dr. Teller's Credentials, San Francisco Chronicle, Aug.
23, 1963, p. 38, col. 5.
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their elected representatives. These situations bear watching by
the legal profession.
It seems clear that science impinges on the law at enough
points that the United States lawyer now has a duty to make a
very real, very serious effort to understand science. Few lawyers
have even a rudimentary education in science and this situation
can no longer be permitted to endure. Law schools must begin to
look for science courses in the college transcripts of applicants and
to turn away those who have no science training. There must be
more communication between science and technology and the
practicing bar. Bar associations must sponsor "law and science"
programs and "computer research" panels.
The law is not married to science, yet the two are not divorced!
